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1. Introduction 
 
Nonlinear pricing is frequently observed in real world oligopolistic markets, often in 
the form of scale discounts which are not totally explicable in terms of costs.  Yet the 
theory of oligopolistic nonlinear pricing (or second degree price discrimination more 
generally) remains incomplete and largely untested.  In a significant development, 
two papers (Armstrong and Vickers 2001 and Rochet and Stole 2002) have offered 
the striking suggestion that firms should offer single cost-based1 two-part tariffs in 
any symmetric equilibrium. Furthermore, when consumers are able to buy two goods 
either from one firm or two, Armstrong and Vickers (2008) extend this intuition to 
suggest that firms may also employ a lump sum discount as a form of mixed 
bundling.  This paper uses the liberalisation of the British retail electricity (and gas) 
industries to examine how these predictions compare to the development of 
oligopolistic tariff competition in practice. 
 
Consistent with these theories, we find that each firm did offer a single two-part 
electricity tariff and that the discounts offered to consumers who chose to purchase 
both electricity and gas were indeed lump sum.  However, inconsistent with the 
theoretical literature, we show that firms’ tariffs are heterogeneous in ways that 
cannot be attributed to cost and that, rather than decreasing, these tariff 
asymmetries have increased over time.  We establish a series of stylised facts to 
explore this finding further.  Among other results, we find that i) relative to the 
incumbent, individual entrants typically set higher fixed fees and lower marginal 
prices, and ii) despite symmetric costs, individual entrants showed differences in 
their tariffs that were systematic across regional markets and time, with some 
entrants regularly favouring fixed fees (marginal prices) that were much higher 
(lower) than the incumbents’, while others typically remained much closer to the 
incumbent.  
 
The existing empirical literature on nonlinear pricing has expanded considerably in 
recent years.2 However, our approach and results differ from these papers in three 
                                                 
1 We use cost-based to refer to a tariff where marginal price equals marginal cost. 
2 As discussed below, much of the literature is based on the US Cellular telephone market (Busse 2000; Miravete 
and Röller 2004; Miravete 2007; Seim and Viard 2008). Others consider the market for Yellow Pages (Busse and 
Rysman 2005) or speciality Coffee Shops (McManus 2007).  Leslie (2004) estimates the welfare effects of price 
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respects.  First, we examine tariffs at the level of individual firms, highlighting the 
importance of tariff asymmetries, rather than considering regularities across firms.3  
We introduce a simple summary statistic for a two-part tariff, the ratio of the fixed fee 
to marginal price, which we term a tariff ‘weighting’, and show that firms’ tariff 
weightings differ significantly and systematically.  Second, unlike much recent 
empirical research which employs fully specified structural models (e.g. Miravete and 
Röller 2004 and McManus 2007), we focus on establishing a series of stylised facts 
through descriptive and reduced form analysis.  This provides more freedom to 
explore the empirical data and enables us to offer an informative complement to the 
existing literature, especially in a context where theoretical understanding remains 
under-developed, though it limits our ability to compare counterfactuals.  Third, 
consistent with the theories of Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole 
(2002), we identify a market where each oligopolist employs a single two-part tariff, 
rather than the multiple tariff options commonly documented elsewhere in the 
literature (Busse 2000, Miravete and Röller 2004 and Seim and Viard 2008).4  
 
The next section briefly introduces the market.  Section 3 summarises the recent 
theoretical literature and extracts some key propositions, which are then tested in 
section 4.  Section 5 explores the nature of the heterogeneity amongst firms’ tariffs.  
Section 6 discusses some implications of our findings, identifies potential future 
research and concludes.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
discrimination at a Broadway theatre. Cohen (2008) provides evidence of price discrimination through the 
package size of paper towels, while controlling for cost factors. 
3 For example, Miravete and Röller (2004), Busse and Rysman (2005) and Seim and Viard (2008) all document 
how competition reduces the level of prices on average across firms and how the reduction is greater for tariffs 
aimed at consumers with higher usage.   
4 McManus (2007) also examines the empirical implications of Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and 
Stole (2002), in the context of product size in the speciality coffee market.  Consistent with the two theories’ 
predictions, he finds that product sizes are close to the efficient level in the most competitive product category.  
However, more in line with the monopoly prediction, he also finds that product sizes are inefficiently small for 
other types of coffee. 
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2. The Market 
 
The retail sector of the electricity industry in Great Britain5 was traditionally 
separated into 14 geographical regions, each with an incumbent monopolist; 
consumers were only able to buy from their local incumbent, and arbitrage was not 
possible.   The industry was privatised in 1990/1, and the household retail sector was 
opened to competition in 1998/9.  Thereafter, significant entry occurred and 
consumers were free to switch away from their regional incumbent (or any 
subsequent supplier) to any entrant within their region without financial penalty. The 
average prices of incumbents (although not entrants’) continued to be regulated until 
April 2002 but no regulatory constraint was imposed on tariff structures (Harker and 
Waddams Price 2007).  Suppliers’ freedom to offer alternative tariff structures was 
confirmed in the privatisation act which explicitly permits but does not mandate two-
part tariffs (Electricity Act 1989 section 18(3)).   
 
The product is essentially homogenous but households vary significantly in their 
levels of consumption.  In all regions, the volume distribution of household 
consumption is positively skewed and approximately lognormal. Figure 1 shows the 
aggregate national distribution.  It is conventional in official statistics (e.g. Ofgem 
2003, p.49) to report data for low, medium and high consumption levels, defined 
respectively as 1,650, 3,300 and 4,950 KWh/year.  These levels will be employed 
later in the paper, and Figure 1 confirms that they approximately correspond to the 
divisions between the four quartiles: 2,016, 3,479 and 5,567.  The mean and 
variance of household consumption are broadly similar across the regions.   
 
Firms are obliged to offer three alternative payment methods between which  
consumers are free to choose – standard credit, direct debit and prepayment.6  
Nearly all electricity suppliers are also active in the gas market, which was liberalised 
a few months earlier. They have increasingly participated in mixed bundling by 
                                                 
5 Electricity supply comprises four vertical stages (generation, transmission, distribution and retail); here, we are 
concerned only with the retail sector, in which the main functions are purchasing the upstream functions, sales, 
marketing and billing to final consumers. 
6 These are effectively three separate markets, catering for consumers who seek different billing arrangements, 
rather than a single market with multiple tariff options.  
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offering a ‘dual-supply discount’ to consumers who buy both fuels from the same 
supplier.  
 
Following liberalisation, there was almost 100% cross-entry by the original regional 
incumbents into each others’ markets.  The incumbent gas supplier also entered all 
regions, as did a few small Independents; see Table 1.  Later, there was a gradual 
exit of Independents, but the main feature was the steady consolidation amongst 
incumbents.7  This began around the time of liberalisation, with the acquisition of 
four of the smaller incumbents, and continued over the following four years with the 
purchase of five other incumbents.  By autumn 2002 the surviving electricity retailers 
had consolidated into 5 major companies, and at the beginning of 2006, these five 
survivors (each now owning ex-incumbents in two or three regions) and the previous 
gas incumbent, British Gas, were the only suppliers.8 
 
Figure 1: National Cumulative Distribution of Household Electricity Consumption 
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Figure 1 is constructed from data for residential consumers, using standard credit single fuel tariffs, 
reported in The Expenditure and Food Survey – a stratified representative national sample – for April 
2002 – April 2003.   
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The figures in Table 1 are net and conceal turbulence in independent entry/exit. 
8 Other small independent companies have entered since, but most have not survived 
 6
 
 
Table 1: Firm Numbers 
 
 Majors Minimajors 
(Small majors) 
Independent British 
Gas 
Total 
Feb 99 5 7 1 1 14 
Oct 99 5 7 2 1 15 
Jun 00 5 5 3 1 14 
Dec 00 5 5 3 1 14 
Jun 01 5 5 3 1 14 
Dec 01 5 2 3 1 11 
Jun 02 5 2 3 1 11 
Dec 02 5 2 3 1 11 
Jun 03 5  2 1 8 
Dec 03 5  2 1 8 
Jun 04 5  2 1 8 
Dec 04 5  1 1 7 
Jun 05 5  1 1 7 
Dec 05 5  1 1 7 
thereafter 5   1 6 
Typically, most firms operated in all 14 regional markets. The exceptions are the two Scottish regions, 
in which there were fewer firms in the earlier periods. 
 
 
Hereafter, we refer to five ‘types’ of firm competing in any regional market as follows. 
 
 Incumbents within their home region, who should enjoy a first-mover 
advantage and potential consumer loyalty. 
 British Gas. Although an entrant, this was the previous nationwide incumbent 
gas supplier and therefore has a familiar brand name.   
 Established firms outside their home regions.  When selling to consumers 
outside their home regions, incumbents from other regions might be viewed 
by consumers as entirely new entities, unable to transfer brand loyalty across 
regions. Within this group we distinguish: 
o Majorsaway – the five surviving original electricity incumbents.  These 
are all vertically integrated and four are now subsidiaries of some of 
Europe’s largest multinational energy companies;   
o Minimajorsaway – the other original incumbents who were 
subsequently acquired by the Majorsaway.  
 Independents.  These firms have no region of previous incumbency.  
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While disaggregated data on market share by firm and region over time are 
unavailable, we do know that in the eight years after liberalisation, nearly half of all 
consumers moved away from their regional incumbent, and all incumbents gradually 
lost market share.  Typically, by 2005, their market share was just over 50% in their 
home region, with British Gas accounting for about 22%, and the Majorsaway for 
about 26% (Ofgem 2008).9  The share of Independents rarely exceeded 1% in any 
region at any time. 
 
 
 
3. Theoretical Literature 
 
The standard results of nonlinear pricing under monopoly are well known (e.g. 
Mussa and Rosen 1978 and Maskin and Riley 1984).  Consumers are assumed to 
possess private information about their tastes in the form of a single parameter 
drawn from a known and well behaved distribution where, in line with the single 
crossing property, higher types are assumed to exhibit a higher marginal utility over 
all units.  If, in addition, consumers have a type-independent outside option, the 
monopolist’s optimal price-quantity schedule is concave such that larger buyers are 
offered a lower average price per unit.  Equivalently, the monopolist should offer a 
menu of two-part tariffs, each with a different marginal price, p , and fixed fee, .  In 
order to extract larger rents from higher types and prevent them from selecting a 
tariff intended for a lower type, marginal prices are inflated above marginal cost for 
all but the highest type.  
F
 
The literature on oligopolistic nonlinear pricing is less well established and remains 
highly dependent upon modelling assumptions (see the reviews by Stole 2007 and 
Armstrong 2006).  We will focus on two branches of this literature, both relevant to a 
market where firms supply two products, such as electricity and gas.  The first 
assumes ‘one-stop shopping’ such that consumers can buy, at most, from a single 
supplier.  The second allows consumers to partake in ‘multi-stop shopping’, in that 
they may buy different products from different suppliers, but cannot purchase the 
                                                 
9 Since then, the incumbent average market share has fallen further with the Majorsaway increasing their share 
to about 30%. 
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same product from more than one firm. While the latter branch appears more 
consistent with the British electricity and gas markets where consumers may choose 
a different supplier for each good, the first branch is instructive in offering a simpler 
perspective of the basic propositions.10  
 
In the one-stop setting, the related propositions of Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and 
Rochet and Stole (2002) are of particular interest and we refer to them as AV and 
RS hereafter.11  A simplified version of the two models is now presented in the case 
where firms sell only a single good, such as electricity, but AV extend the results to a 
multi-product setting.  Two firms, RLj , , are located at either end of a unit line and 
have symmetric per-consumer costs, .  AV assume the firms have a marginal 
cost, , and a fixed cost of serving one consumer, , whilst RS assume the firms 
have a strictly convex cost function. In a one-shot game, each firm simultaneously 
sets a price-quantity schedule, T , to a unit mass of fully rational consumers.  The 
consumers exhibit two forms of unobserved, independent heterogeneity.  First, as in 
the monopoly case, consumers are heterogeneous in their marginal utility over all 
units of consumption, 
)(qC
)(qj
c k
 .  This is labelled vertical heterogeneity.  Second, consumers 
also exhibit horizontal heterogeneity. Specifically, they incur transport costs that are 
independent of consumption volume, as captured by the consumer’s location, 
, and a travel cost parameter, ]1,0[x  .  Assuming that the two forms of 
heterogeneity enter the utility function additively and separately, a consumer located 
at point x  receives a utility of U )(qL),( q Tx   (or )()1(),( qTxq RU  ) if he 
purchases  units from firm  (or 0q L R ).  Each consumer’s taste parameters, 
},{ x , are drawn from independent distributions.12  Proposition 1 follows under the 
further assumption that the market is covered in equilibrium such that all consumers 
                                                 
10  A third branch (e.g. Miravete and Röller 2004), assumes consumers may buy the same product from different 
suppliers, but this assumption is inappropriate for the present market, 
11 RS present their model in the context of quality, rather than quantity, discrimination, but as the two forms are 
often interchangeable, we refer to their results in the context of quantity discrimination. 
12 AV allow   to be multi-dimensional and place no restrictions on its distribution or the form of the utility function 
but present their results with the assumption that x  is distributed uniformly. RS assume   is drawn from )(H  
with a utility function such that the single crossing property holds, and that x  is drawn from  which is 
symmetric and log concave. 
)(xG
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buy.13 A similar result can also be found for the case of an -firm oligopoly (see RS, 
Proposition 7).  
n
 
Proposition 1 (one-stop shopping, single product): Under the assumption 
that i) the market is covered in equilibrium for all types; ii) costs are symmetric; and 
horizontal preferences are iii) independent of vertical preferences and iv) 
symmetrically distributed, the unique symmetric equilibrium involves all firms offering 
a single, identical two-part tariff, pqFqT )( , where the marginal price is equal to 
marginal cost, . )(' qCp 
 
Thus, in contrast to the wide variety of largely non-cost-related tariffs offered by an 
optimising monopolist, Proposition 1 suggests that the introduction of competition 
may prompt firms to adopt a single, identical two-part cost-based tariff.  The 
existence of this equilibrium largely derives from the fact that the equilibrium would 
remain unchanged even if the vertical preference parameter, , of each consumer 
was common knowledge.  With such information, it can be shown that a firm would 
best respond to its rival’s choice of a cost-based two-part tariff, by offering each 
consumer its efficient quantity for a total price of 
q
q)qC ('F  . However, such a 
strategy can still be implemented without knowledge of vertical preferences, by using 
the proposed cost-based two-part tariff.  For uniqueness, we also know that in any 
other symmetric outcome, a supplier could increase its profits by offering a cost-
based two-part tariff, as by doing so it could generate a higher consumer surplus via 
the efficiency properties of pricing at marginal cost.   
 
The second branch of the literature allows for multi-stop shopping and has received 
less attention. We focus on the two-good scenario in Armstrong and Vickers (2008), 
corresponding to the case of electricity and gas.  The model assumes that two firms, 
, each sell two goods , with symmetric marginal costs, .  As before, 
consumers exhibit independent horizontal and vertical heterogeneity. However, 
horizontal heterogeneity is now expanded to include an independent location 
parameter for each good, { .   Just as we observe in the electricity market, 
RLj , 2,1i
}, 21 x
ic
x
                                                 
13 Specifically this is from i) AV Proposition 5 for the case of a single good, where uniqueness is further later 
demonstrated in Armstrong and Vickers (2006, Proposition 1) and ii) RS Proposition 6 under an assumption of a 
symmetric distribution. 
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consumers can choose to purchase both goods from the same firm or buy one good 
from each supplier for an extra shopping cost o 0 .  Firm j ’s tariff choices can 
be disaggregated into a tariff for consumers who buy just good 1, ) , a tariff for 
consumers who buy just good 2, , and a two-product tariff for consumers who 
buy both goods, .  Assuming that all consumers buy both goods in 
equilibrium, Proposition 2 extends the logic of the one-stop shopping case in 
Proposition  1 (Armstrong and Vickers 2008, Proposition 3): 
f z
( 11 qT
j
0
)( 22 qT
j
),( 2112 qqT
j
 
Proposition 2 (multi-stop shopping, two products): Under the assumption 
that i) the market is covered in equilibrium for all types and both goods; ii) costs are 
symmetric; and horizontal preferences are iii) independent of vertical preferences 
and iv) symmetrically distributed, a symmetric equilibrium exists where each firm 
sets three cost-based two-part tariffs, where the two-product tariff is composed of the 
sum of the single product tariffs minus a lump sum discount,  
2
, such that 
 for  and Tiiiii qcFqT )( 2,1i 2c111( qqcFF 2 )2112 ),( qq .   
 
 
Thus, under assumptions (i)-(iv), both branches of the literature predict that 
electricity suppliers would use identical cost-based two-part tariffs.  But how 
applicable are these assumptions to the UK electricity and gas markets, and, if not, 
does theory offer any alternative predictions?  A priori, assumptions (i) and (iii) seem 
reasonable in this context, but (ii) and (iv) are more debatable. 
 
(i) market coverage  
As electricity and gas are minimally differentiated essential goods, the market is 
likely to be covered; indeed, Armstrong and Vickers (2008) cite the UK market as a 
motivating example for their model.14   
(iii) independent heterogeneity  
There is no obvious reason to expect vertical and horizontal preferences to be 
correlated.15 
                                                 
14 Although not all households are connected to the gas network, because of the expense of extending it to rural 
areas, nearly all of those which are consume gas. 
15 If the market is not covered, or if horizontal and vertical preferences are correlated, the literature predicts that 
firms are more likely to select a symmetric menu of multiple non-cost-based tariffs, more akin to the monopoly 
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(ii) cost symmetry  
In the next section, we argue that within-region costs are likely to be symmetric only 
between entrants, and that incumbents may enjoy some cost advantage. The 
literature makes few predictions about the effect of introducing cost asymmetries, 
although Yin (2004) provides some insight within a special case, as summarised in 
Proposition 1b. 
 
Proposition 1b: In the context of one-stop shopping with asymmetric costs, but 
where no vertical heterogeneity exists and where firms can only use two-part tariffs, 
equilibrium tariffs are asymmetric but remain cost-based. 
 
(iv) symmetric brand (horizontal) preferences,  
It is conceivable that brand preferences may not be symmetric because consumers 
may have some loyalty to, or at least face switching costs when moving away from, 
the incumbent.  Asymmetric preferences are examined as an extension to 
Proposition 1 by RS (Proposition 6), as summarised below. 
 
Proposition 1c: In the context of one-stop shopping with asymmetric horizontal 
preferences, , equilibrium tariffs are asymmetric but remain cost-based. 
Marginal prices remain at cost and the favoured firm optimally sets a relatively higher 
fixed fee. 
)(xG
 
In summary then, it appears that current theory can offer no explanation for a 
scenario in which firms each select a single two-part tariff, but which differs between 
firms in a way which cannot be attributed to asymmetries in marginal costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
prediction (Yang and Ye 2008 and Bonatti 2008). Yang and Ye allow for non-coverage in the RS framework.  In 
contrast to the standard approach, Bonatti allows consumers’ vertical taste parameters to be supplier-specific, 
such that consumers who place a high marginal utility on consuming from firm i  also have a strong brand 
preference for firm i . Related results are also found in Yin’s (2004) special set-up outlined below, where cost-
based pricing is shown to break down if (horizontal) transport costs become dependent upon consumption.   
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4. Tests of Theory: A Single Two-Part Tariff? 
 
These propositions are now tested by taking the following questions to the data.  
With monopoly replaced by oligopoly, do firms offer single, identical two-part-tariffs? 
If not, can asymmetries be explained in terms of differential marginal costs, and do 
incumbents set higher fixed fees? With mixed bundling of electricity and gas 
possible, do firms offer bundled tariffs involving a simple lump sum discount? 
 
4.1 Data 
We employ a database of tariff structures, observed at the individual firm level, within 
each of the 14 regions, at 14 six-monthly intervals,16 1999-2005.  As explained 
earlier, 1999-2002 was a period of consolidation, entry and exit, while 2003-5 was a 
period of more stable market structure with consolidation complete.  Since early 
2006, there has been considerable volatility in the wholesale market and firms have 
responded by introducing additional tracker deals or fixed-period tariffs, alongside 
their regular tariffs (Ofgem 2008, figure 7.2, p.75 and pp. 92-3.)  Since these 
additional tariffs take the market beyond the setting addressed by the theoretical 
literature reviewed, we end our time period at December 2005.  All observations 
refer to standard credit electricity, which was the predominant payment method for 
this period.17  
 
4.2 Pre-Liberalisation 
Prior to liberalisation, each regional incumbent offered consumers only a single two-
part tariff, with a fixed fee  per household and a single marginal price .  
Figure 2 illustrates the heterogeneity of these two-part tariffs across the 14 regions, 
partly reflecting geographical differences in distribution cost.  Clearly, these 
)(F )(p
                                                 
16 The sources for these data were price sheets provided in various formats by the Consumers Association and 
the consumer watchdog, Energywatch.  June and December were selected because, for the period under 
consideration, tariffs rarely changed more frequently than twice a year, and such changes usually occurred in 
April (and occasionally October) and would have been fully recorded by June and December. Exceptionally, for 
1999, the observations relate to February and October to capture the effects of market opening.   
17 See footnote 4.  Direct debit tariffs typically offer a lump sum discount on standard credit (differing only slightly 
across firms and time, within the narrow range £8-15 per annum during this period).  Prepayment, on the other 
hand, entails surcharges on standard credit.  Conceivably, the provision of alternative payment methods may 
constitute a further deliberate form of price discrimination – although the discounts/surcharges are typically 
justified in publicity in terms of cost.  In line with the theory above, we sidestep this issue by focusing explicitly 
only on discrimination in the form of nonlinear pricing, and bypass alternative payment methods.  However, given 
the lump sum, more or less constant, nature of the direct debit discount, it is likely that all our empirical findings 
would remain robust across other payment methods. 
 13
 
 
privatised (albeit only recently at that time) incumbent monopolists chose not to offer 
a menu of multiple two-part tariffs, as theory would predict for a profit maximising 
monopolist. Explaining such behaviour is not the purpose of the present paper, but 
we return to this issue in the concluding section. 
 
 
Figure 2: Pre-Liberalisation Standard Credit Tariffs of Incumbents, 1998 
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Turning to the post-liberalisation period, the data support the following five stylised 
facts.   
 
Stylised Fact 1:  Firms offered only single tariffs, and the two-part tariff was 
pervasive throughout.   
 
Table 2 reveals that there are only three types of tariff structure observed: i) standard 
two-part tariffs, , ii) tariffs with a zero fixed fee, but two marginal prices:  
 for units below (beyond) some very low consumption threshold, , and iii) 
three-part tariffs, with a positive fixed fee and two marginal prices.  We interpret the 
second form of tariff as little more than a marketing variation on the standard two-
part tariff, since 
},{ Fp
T
Hp
)( Lp )( TX
X  was typically set at levels well below the consumption of the 
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vast majority of consumers.18 Rational consumers would treat such tariffs as 
arithmetically ‘equivalent’ to a standard two-part tariff, with marginal price, , and 
fixed fee,  within our theoretical context.  The third, three-part, form 
of tariff initially accounted for a small proportion of the tariffs and had virtually 
disappeared by 2002. Moreover, the curvature of these tariffs was minimal, with only 
a small difference between  and . 
Lp
)( LHT ppXF 
Hp Lp
 
Table 2: Incidence of Different Tariff Structures (%) 
  Standard 2 part 
Equivalent 2 
part 3 part 
1999 82 6 12 
2000 77 16 7 
2001 78 14 8 
2002 64 34 2 
2003 65 33 1 
2004 62 36 1 
2005 63 37 0 
total period 70 25 5 
This table is based on counts at year-ends. 
 
 
Stylised Fact 2:  Firms did not set identical two-part tariffs in the typical market. 
 
The simple scattergram of  against F p  for the pooled database Figure 3(i)  reveals 
considerable heterogeneity between firms in their two-part tariffs,19 and the 
descriptive statistics reported in the first three columns of Table 3 confirm that this is 
true for every point in time: the standard deviation of p  is approximately 10% of the  
mean and rising through the period, and the standard deviation of  is between 
25% and 38% of the mean, and also rises sharply through the period. A standard 
analysis of variance establishes conclusively that the dominant source of this 
dispersion is within-region rather than between-region: the fourth and fifth columns of 
the table show that within-region variance accounts for between 63% and 97% of the 
F
                                                 
18 The threshold is 900 KwH or less in 97% of observations. Interpolation within Figure 1 above suggests that 
only 4% of households had lower consumption than this (and many of these pay by prepayment, rather than 
standard credit to which these data apply). 
19 Hereafter, each firm’s tariff is expressed in terms of just and F p .  For the ‘equivalent’ two-part tariffs, the 
‘equivalent ’ is computed as described in the text; and for the three-part tariffs, F p  is measured by whichever 
of  or  applies for the ‘typical’ consumer, with Hp Lp X = 3300. This is invariably . Lp
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total variance in p  and 82-97% for .  Figure 3(ii) illustrates the extent of dispersion 
at the regional level, using Eastern as an example (all others regions reveal similar 
patterns).  The fact that dispersion is prevalent within regions is important because 
the region is the natural definition of the market in this context.   
F
 
Figure 3(i): Scatter of  against F p , Pooled over all Regions 
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Figure 3(ii): Scatter of againstF p ,for Sample Region (Eastern) 
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Figure 3(iii)  vs F p : Entrants Relative to Incumbents, Scatter for Pooled Sample  
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for p  and  F
 
 Descriptives Decomposition of Variance % 
 Year St.Dev Mean CoefV Within-region Between-region 
Mean Entrant-
Mean Incumbent 
Range amongst 
entrants 
Marginal price ( p ) 
1999 0.48 6.26 0.08 77.8 22.2 -0.48 1.29 
2000 0.59 5.96 0.10 66.0 34.0 -0.59 1.61 
2001 0.55 5.81 0.10 63.2 36.8 -0.84 1.11 
2002 0.67 5.84 0.12 73.3 26.7 -0.85 1.86 
2003 0.70 6.06 0.12 72.2 27.8 -0.94 1.39 
2004 0.89 6.79 0.13 88.1 11.9 -1.11 2.12 
2005 1.12 7.70 0.15 96.6  3.4 -1.32 2.61 
Fixed fee ( ) F
1999 1208 4761 0.25 83.1 16.9   667 3615 
2000 1136 4443 0.26 86.4 13.6   513 3545 
2001 1065 4429 0.24 82.8 17.2   459 2929 
2002 1137 4597 0.25 90.0 10.0   534 3397 
2003 1424 4602 0.31 97.3   2.7 1050 3814 
2004 1822 4799 0.38 91.4   8.6 1332 4888 
2005 1958 5123 0.38 89.3 10.7 1372 5447 
Note: This table describes the data only at year-ends. 
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Table 4: Breakdown of Retailers’ Costs, 2003 
 
 %  of 
total 
Sources of variability Firms which might enjoy cost 
advantages within region 
Generation20 30 Firms with integrated generation and retail 
activities (mainly incumbents and 
majorsaway) can hedge volatile wholesale 
prices more cheaply.    
Firms which are vertically 
integrated 
Transmission 
including 
systems losses 
4 These vary between regions and suppliers, 
depending on the location of generation 
relative to the market, but they will not vary 
within regions 
- 
Distribution 
including 
systems losses 
34 Distribution tariffs vary significantly between 
regions, but not at all within regions.  
- 
Metering 9 -  
Retail excluding 
metering 
15 Incumbents may have marketing/advertising 
advantage; entrants must overcome inertia 
and lack of brand name. 
Incumbents 
VAT & sundries 9 Common across firms - 
Source: Cornwall (2008), 2001-02 OFGEM distribution tariffs and authors’ estimates. 
 
 
Stylised Fact 3: The asymmetries between firms’ two-part tariffs cannot be 
explained purely in terms of differences in costs. 
 
There are few published data on costs at the individual firm level, so evidence for 
this fact is necessarily indirect, but nevertheless conclusive.  Retailers in this industry 
face five types of marginal cost (Table 4), and while these may lead to significant 
cost differences between regions (notably in distribution costs), within-region 
variation in marginal costs is likely to be small.  Indeed, the only likely sources of 
marginal cost asymmetries within a given region derive from generation and retail 
costs, and these are likely to favour the incumbents relative to entrants.  Despite this 
however, our data show that incumbents typically set a higher marginal price than 
entrants.  This is shown in Figure 3(iii), which reframes Figure 3(i), by plotting the 
differential between each entrant’s fixed fee and the incumbent’s fixed fee, against 
the gap between the entrant’s and incumbent’s marginal price.  The vast majority of 
observations lie in the top left quadrant, indicating that most entrants charge a lower 
marginal price and higher fixed fee than does the relevant incumbent.  The sixth 
column of Table 3 quantifies the typical difference between entrants’ and 
                                                 
20  A common clearing market presented all suppliers with similar marginal generation costs, even after the 
closure of the Electricity Pool in 2001. 
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incumbents’ marginal prices over time: as a proportion of mean price, this is about 
10-15%, and rising through the period.  The last column of Table 3 also shows that 
there is typically a large range of marginal prices amongst entrants in any given 
region.  Again, there is no cost-based explanation for this, as we would expect 
entrants to share a similar cost structure. 
 
The evidence of Table 3 and Figures 3 also leads immediately to: 
 
Stylised Fact 4: Contrary to Proposition 1c, incumbents do not exploit potential 
incumbency advantages by setting relatively higher fixed fees.  In fact, the reverse is 
true. 
 
Finally, turning to the tariffs for bundled electricity and gas: 
Stylised Fact 5: The predominant (but not unanimous) form of dual fuel discount 
is a relatively small lump sum. 
Comparable data on these discounts for the Majorsaway and British Gas are 
available from 2002 onwards, and this provides an opportunity to test Proposition 2. 
Three of these six firms offered a lump sum discount of between £10 and £15 
throughout, one offered no discount, one used a lump sum but appears to have later 
switched to a proportionate discount, and one offered a proportionate discount 
throughout.  In all cases this discount amounted to 1.5-3% of the typical bill.  This is 
broadly in keeping with the results of Armstrong and Vickers (2008), but the co-
existence of proportionate and zero discounts suggests that more evidence is 
warranted.  For the remainder of the paper, we focus on electricity-only tariffs.  
 
 
 
5. Tariff Heterogeneity 
 
Some of the findings in the previous section – the prevalence of single, two-part 
tariffs and lump-sum bundling discounts – are consistent with theory, but the 
widespread non-cost-related tariff asymmetries between firms within regional 
markets are not. This section identifies some systematic features of these 
asymmetries.   
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For these purposes it is useful to summarise each two-part tariff with a single 
statistic. We choose the ratio of a tariff’s fixed fee to its marginal price, referred to 
hereafter as the tariff’s weighting, . Tariffs with higher weighting rely more on the 
fixed fee than the marginal price to raise revenue, and, ceteris paribus, will be more 
attractive to high volume consumers.  
W
 
)/( pFW           (1) 
  
As shown above, there is considerable dispersion in the two components of W , and 
this dispersion is accentuated by a strong inverse correlation between the two 
(typically between -0.4 and -0.6).  Across the sample, W  has a mean and standard 
deviation of 770 and 265 respectively, with an approximately normal distribution.21 
Figures 4a, b and c demonstrate some further features of W .   
 
Figure 4a shows that the average tariff weighting remained fairly stable during the 
first part of the period, before declining steadily in the second part. More strikingly, 
the asymmetry in firms’ tariffs, as measured by the standard deviation of W , rose 
dramatically in the second part of the period after a period of initial stability.22 Figure 
4b explores this dispersion by reporting the results of decomposing the variance of 
 both by region and by firm.W 23  Decomposing by region, the within-region 
component clearly dominates: it always accounts for the major share (about 90%), 
and this rises further in the later part of the period.  This confirms the implications of 
the similar decompositions for p  and  in the previous section.  Although there are 
non-trivial differences between regions (probably due to differential distribution 
costs), it is heterogeneity between firms within-regions which is the main cause of 
dispersion.  Alternatively, decomposing the variance by firm, it is the between-firm 
component which dominates, but less heavily.  This is not surprising since within-
region and between-firm variances reflect two sides of the same coin.
F
24  However, 
the fact that within-region variation accounts for a larger share than between-firm 
adds a further insight.  It implies that firms do not simply apply the same tariff 
                                                 
21 This implies that on average, the fixed fee accounts for 13% of a high volume consumer’s typical bill, as 
opposed to 20% for a medium volume consumer, or 30% for a low volume consumer.  
22 This growth is even more marked if dispersion is measured by the coefficient of variation.  
23  The figure only displays the dominant component in each case. 
24 In the extreme case where all firms set the same W  in all regions, but the value of W  differs between firms, 
within-region and between-firm variance would be identical, and would both account for 100% of the total 
variance in their respective decompositions. 
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nationwide across all regions – instead, they employ at least some degree of ‘region-
specificity’.  
 
5.1 Entrants versus Incumbents 
One obvious explanation for some region-specificity has been implied already by the 
finding from Table 3, that incumbents typically select higher marginal prices and 
lower fixed fees, and therefore lower W , than do entrants. Remembering that most 
firms in this industry are incumbents in some regions but entrants in others, this is an 
obvious source of within-firm heterogeneity.   
 
Figure 4a: Mean and Standard Deviation W  over time for Pooled Sample 
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Figure 4b: Decomposition of Variance of W  over time, by Firm and Region 
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Figure 4c: Mean W  – Entrants versus Incumbents 
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Within-firm heterogeneity is confirmed in Figure 4c which depicts the time paths of 
the mean tariff weighting for incumbents, entrants and ‘Majorsaway’ (averaged 
across all regions).  In both cases, there is a persistent and significantly positive 
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differential between entrants and incumbents,25 and this widens in the second part of 
the time period.  In the case of the Majorsaway, this has an important additional 
interpretation: because these firms are the incumbents in some regions but entrants 
in others, it refers not only to the differences between entrants and incumbents within 
markets, but also to the differences between the weightings chosen by firms in their 
‘home’ (incumbent) markets and in their ‘away’ (entrant) markets.  This leads to: 
 
Stylised Fact 6: Entrants typically set higher tariff weightings than incumbents. 
 
Stylised Fact 7: Majors typically set higher tariff weightings when playing the role 
of entrant rather than the incumbent.  
 
The other striking feature of all three parts of Figure 4 is the contrast between the 
early (1999-2002) and later parts (2003-5) of the period.  Recall that until 2002, there 
were important structural changes arising from the acquisitions of the Minimajors by 
the Majors and the entry/exit of smaller Independents.  Moreover, incumbents were 
still subject to price-cap regulation.  With this consolidation completed and regulation 
removed, it appears that tariff weightings became even more dispersed.  While it is 
impossible to establish a direct causality with the data at our disposal,26 the 
possibility of a structural break is explored econometrically below.   
 
5.2 Heterogeneity amongst Entrants 
This section examines heterogeneity amongst entrants.  Given the absence of any 
theoretical explanation for such tariff heterogeneity, we do not attempt to specify and 
estimate a structural model.  Instead, we seek to identify how far this source of 
                                                 
25 In both cases, the mean differential is significantly different from zero at the 99% level at each point in time. 
26 On the potential impact of the removal of regulation, the previous literature provides an equivocal message. In 
the theoretical regulation literature, two papers consider the potential effects of price caps on average revenue 
per unit (the form of regulation imposed in this case.)  Bradley and Price (1988) show that this form of regulation 
should induce a monopolist to raise the least price-responsive element of its tariff.  Assuming, not unreasonably, 
that this is the fixed fee, the implication is that the removal of regulation should induce the monopolist to lower its 
fixed fee (and thus lower W ).  Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1995, Corollary 1) establish a qualitatively similar 
result: a regulated monopolist will serve sufficiently high-type consumers with larger quantities than is efficient, 
using a marginal price less than marginal cost.  So in both cases, the implication is that the removal of regulation 
should have lead to lower tariff weightings – as is observed here.  However, both papers are confined to 
regulated monopolists rather than oligopoly.  The empirical literature, on the other hand, suggests that the 
regulation was non-binding.  By the time that regulation was removed, OFGEM (2001) reports that all but three 
incumbents were charging less than permitted under the price cap by between 0.4 and 2.2%; and Giulietti and 
Waddams Price (2005) find that firms had not increased their fixed fees in response to the incentives presented 
by the price cap.  Therefore, we leave open the issue of whether deregulation in 2002 was the cause of 
increased dispersion. 
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heterogeneity can be identified with robust systematic differentials between different 
entrants.  To do this, we fit a simple disaggregated equation on firm-level tariff 
weightings for the full sample of entrants. For each market (region) j  at time t , 
suppose that entrant k , )1,...(1  nk , sets its tariff weighting, , relative to the 
incumbent’s, , such that
k
jtW
I
jtW
27 
 
k
jt
I
jt
kI
jt
k
jt WWW         (2) 
 
Results are shown in Table 5. 
                                                 
27 This relationship can be derived from linear best-response functions in weightings (see appendix). 
 25
 
 
Table 5:  Entrant Tariff Weightings Relative to Incumbent ( )* IE WW 
 
Explanatory 
variables 
I II III IV V 
Incumbent  ( ) IW -0.847 (0.035) -0.839(0.032) -0.796(0.033) -0.788(0.036) -0.784(0.035)
Intercept*  701.6 (20.8) 609.4 (18.5) 401.0 (22.9) 459.5 (21.7) 457.0 (21.1)
BritishGas  245.8   (8.5) 429.5 (12.7) 378.9 (10.5) 441.7 (23.7)
Independent  224.5 (17.6)  
Minimajorsaway  59.2 (10.5)  
Majorsaway   
EDF  137.0 (15.6) 27.5 (9.4) 42.9 (11.8)
NPower   342.7 (17.0) 386.7 (12.6) 402.1 (14.5)
SSE   -0.6 (16.3)† -63.4 (15.9) -47.3  (14.6)
Scottish Power  428.6 (16.0) 327.4 (13.9) 342.8 (15.8)
Minimajorsaway   
Northern Electric  314.6 (43.6) 251.9 (42.5) 267.4 (44.4)
Norweb  264.5 (16.7) 201.5 (11.9) 216.9 (13.6)
Seeboard  216.2 (19.7) 154.2 (16.8) 168.5 (19.4)
Swalec  32.1 (23.7)† -30.9 (21.9)† 
Sweb  167.1 (24.7) 103.9 (23.1) 119.3 (22.2)
TXU  180.7 (21.9) 118.7 (19.6) 133.1 (19.6)
Yorkshire  371.4 (19.0) 308.4 (14.8) 323.8 (15.5)
Independents   
Atlantic  312.1 (18.0) 253.9 (18.0) 264.9 (17.7)
Basic  684.1 (28.7) 396.2 (35.0) 411.6 (35.7)
Amerada  224.3 (14.5) 161.3 (11.8) 176.7 (14.1)
Independent  334.4 (18.9) 271.4 (16.7) 286.8 (16.3)
Northern Energy  20.5 (29.1)† -42.5 (27.0)† 
Interacted with post-2002 dummy 
IW   -.014 (.030)† 
British Gas  -16.9 (24.3)† 
EDF  105.6 (21.3) 98.7 (13.7)
NPower   -219.9 (33.9) -227.4 (29.7)
Powergen   -125.9 (27.0) -117.8 (23.4)
SSE   7.4 (28.4)† 
Scottish Power  84.3 (32.0) 78.0 (26.8)
Basic  393.2 (45.3) 386.9 (42.6)
R2 0.298 0.404 0.674 0.723 0.723
F   308.4 83.0 4.3 
* Notes: N= 1850; Standard errors are shown in parentheses; all coefficient estimates are significant 
at the 1%  level except those marked as † and shown in italics, which are not significant at the 5% 
level. Default: Majorsaway (II) or Powergen (III-V);  is instrumented as described in the text; 
equations are estimated in STATA employing the robust correction. The reported F statistics allow us 
to reject the hypotheses that: the firm type variables in II are homogeneous; the individual firms in 
each type in III are homogeneous; and the coefficients of the estimated model are identical in the two 
sub-periods in IV (confirming the existence of a structural break). 
IW
 
The equation is first estimated (in column I) abstracting from any systematic 
heterogeneity amongst entrants, i.e. with  k k .  This is extended (in II) to 
include fixed effects for each of the four entrant-types; and then (in III) to allow for 
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different fixed effects for all entrants individually, k )1,...(1  nk .  Equations (IV) 
and (V) test for a possible structural break, midway through the period, coinciding 
with the completion of firm consolidation and the final deregulation of the industry, 
described above.   
 
Throughout, the equation is estimated using a vector of variables to instrument the 
incumbent’s tariff weighting, . While each of these instruments is a plausible 
determinant of , none should have any obvious correlation with the magnitudes of 
the entrant-incumbent differential. The instruments are a wholesale price index of 
electricity (WP
IW
IW
28), the pre-liberalisation tariff weighting in region j (INITIAL_W), and 
fixed effects by identity of the incumbent in j (INC_IDENTITY).  WP is included as it 
is a major component of the retailers’ marginal costs; INIT_W is included to 
represent broad differences between regions in costs and demand factors – these 
should be the main reasons why incumbents employed weightings which differed 
between regions before the advent of competition; and INC_IDENTITY allows for 
differences between incumbents in their home market strategies.  The latter should 
also capture any shifts in incumbent strategies in those regions where the identity of 
incumbent changes because of acquisition.  Hausman-Wu tests reject the null 
hypothesis of exogeneity of the incumbent’s weighting at the 95% level in all five 
equations. All equations are estimated using a cluster estimator, with observations 
clustered by region at each point in time, to allow for the likelihood of a common 
component in the disturbance term (Wooldridge, 2002).  
 
Equation (I) establishes two findings which are robust across all five equations.  
First, the   coefficient is negative but significantly smaller than (absolute) unity.  
This confirms that entrants employ tariff weightings which are sensitive to the 
magnitude of the incumbent’s weighting, but suggests ‘incomplete adjustment’, in the 
sense that the differential becomes larger (smaller) when the incumbent lowers 
(raises) its weighting.  Second, the intercept confirms the pervasive tendency for 
entrants to set higher tariff weightings than the incumbent: the absolute size of the 
differential depends on the magnitude of , but it is positive (206) at mean  and IW IW
                                                 
28 Constructed from data published in Quarterly Energy Prices (e.g. 2008, Department of Energy and Climate 
Change). 
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for 95% of all sample observations on .   However, crucially, the overall fit reveals 
that over 70% of the dispersion in tariff weightings remains unexplained:  
IW
 
Stylised Fact 8: There is considerable heterogeneity amongst entrants in their 
tariff weightings.  
 
Equations (II) and (III) explore this residual heterogeneity by allowing for differences 
between types of entrant and by individual firms.  With Majorsaway used as the 
default category, equation (II) reveals systematic differences between the four firm 
types, with British Gas and Independents setting the highest tariff weightings (not 
significantly different from each other), and the Majorsaway the lowest.  Although 
inclusion of these firm-types significantly raises the overall fit, there is clearly still 
considerable within-type heterogeneity.  Once fixed effects for each firm individually 
are included, in equation (III), the unexplained heterogeneity is significantly further 
reduced. Two-thirds of the variance is explained purely by including fixed effects for 
the identities of individual entrants. This suggests that a sizeable majority of entrant 
heterogeneity can be explained by simple firm differences which appear to be robust 
across the 14 different regions and over the 14 different time points. 
 
Stylised Fact 9: Much of the heterogeneity between entrants is systematic  
across regions and over time.  
 
Finally, to explore the increased heterogeneity post-2002, as revealed in figures 4a)-
c), equation IV allows coefficients to differ between the two sub-periods 1999-2002 
and 2003-5.  The F test reported under equation (IV) confirms the existence of a 
structural break, and equation (V) re-estimates (IV) excluding all insignificant 
variables.   
 
To assist interpretation of the results in equation (V), Table 6 employs the estimated 
coefficients to compute the predicted differential between each entrant and the 
incumbent, in each sub-period, evaluated at sample mean values of .  This 
serves two purposes.  First, it illustrates the main sources of heterogeneity between 
entrants:  only four of the eighteen entrants opted for a tariff weighting which is 
typically lower than the incumbent’s, and even these are only marginally so.  
IW
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Amongst the other fourteen, the largest differentials are set by British Gas, most of 
the Independents and two of the Majorsaway.  
 
Second, Table 6 helps to clarify the (arithmetic) causes of the increase in 
heterogeneity after 2003.  As can be seen, the differential increases for British Gas, 
three of the Majorsaway and the (one remaining) independent.  Summing across all 
entrants, there is a near doubling in both the aggregate mean differential and its 
standard deviation: on average, entrants distanced themselves further from 
incumbents, and dispersion amongst entrants increased.  In addition, because of the 
significant exit by 2002, there is also a composition effect which contributes to the 
measured heterogeneity, because the exitors tended to exhibit lower differentials in 
the first sub-period.  To quantify this effect the final two rows show the changes in 
the mean differential and its standard deviation for the set of surviving firms only.  
This reduces, but by no means removes, the increases between the two sub-
periods; the composition effect is contributory, but, even controlling for this, there 
remains a widening of the differential, vis-à-vis incumbents, for the surviving 
entrants.   
 
Stylised Fact 10: Tariff heterogeneity increased over time because of three 
effects: (i) increased asymmetry between entrants and incumbents; ii) increased 
asymmetry amongst entrants; and iii) the exit of entrants whose tariff weightings 
were initially close to the incumbent’s.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 29
 
 
Table 6: Mean Predicted Entrant-Incumbent Differentials* ( )  IE WW 
 1999-2002 2003-5 
BritishGas 340 410 
 
Majorsaway  
NPower  360 203 
Scottish Power 301 449 
EDF 1 170 
Powergen -42 -89 
SSE  -89 -19 
Type Mean 106 143 
  
Minimajorsaway  
Seeboard 126 n.a. 
Yorkshire 281 n.a. 
Northern Electric 225 n.a. 
Norweb 175 n.a. 
TXU 91 n.a. 
Sweb 77 n.a. 
Swalec -42 n.a. 
Type Mean 133 n.a. 
  
Independents  
Basic 370 827 
Independent 245 n.a. 
Atlantic 222 n.a. 
Amerada 135 n.a. 
Northern Energy -42 n.a. 
Type Mean 186 827 
  
Aggregate Mean 151 279 
Aggregate St. Dev. 147 290 
  
Surviving  firms only  
Mean 177 279 
St. Dev. 194 290 
* Evaluated at mean  (618 in 1999-2002, 528 in 2003-5), using coefficient estimates from 
equation V, Table 6.  n.a. implies that the firm had exited by the start of the second sub-period. 
IW
 
 
 30
 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
This paper has tested the findings of some recent developments in the theory of 
oligopolistic nonlinear pricing.  In line with these predictions, we have found that 
suppliers in the newly liberalised British electricity market offered single two-part 
electricity tariffs and simple lump sum discounts for bundled electricity and gas 
tariffs. However, contrary to current theory, suppliers vary considerably in their 
chosen tariffs within a given market in ways that cannot be attributed to marginal 
cost differences.  Further examination of heterogeneity amongst firms in any market 
reveals three key facts: 1) relative to incumbents, entrants tend to select two-part 
tariffs with higher tariff weightings (higher fixed fees and lower marginal prices); 2) 
despite likely symmetric costs amongst, there is a systematic heterogeneity in their 
tariff weightings across different types of entrants and between individual entrants; 
and 3) these asymmetries increased over time. 
 
To our knowledge, there is no current theoretical explanation of how these observed 
non-cost-based tariff asymmetries can occur in an oligopolistic equilibrium. Part of 
the answer might lie in the institutional details of this particular market.  Pre-
liberalisation, governmental pressure on incumbents to serve low-income consumers 
may have led to a downward distortion in their tariff weightings, and this may have 
persisted into the post-liberalisation era due to price regulation in the early years and 
potential consumer resistance.  However, this fails to explain the systematic and 
increasing tariff heterogeneity between different entrants.  We identify three potential 
explanations of heterogeneity as directions for future research.  
 
First, there is a conflict between the assumed one-shot, one-stage nature of 
competition in the theory and the observed repeated multi-market interaction in this 
case.  This leads to the question, could the observed heterogeneity result from 
collusive forces?  If the level of interaction were sufficient to foster collusion, the set 
of market tariffs would imitate a monopolist’s optimal menu of two-part tariffs. Such a 
menu may be well approximated by a small, finite number of tariffs and so a collusive 
outcome could be consistent with each supplier offering a different single two-part 
tariff.  Alternatively, even in a non-cooperative setting, could firms have the incentive 
to differentiate their tariff weighting so as to each appeal to a different group of 
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consumers (identified by usage intensity)?  This possibility resonates with the work 
of Champsaur and Rochet (1989, 1990), in which they demonstrate, in the parallel 
setting of quality, rather than quantity, discrimination, how similar incentives can 
prompt duopolists to select asymmetric quality levels and prices.  Under a specific 
functional form, this incentive is so strong that each firm picks only a single, 
asymmetric quality level (with asymmetric price).  While it is inappropriate to transfer 
this logic directly to a setting of quantity discrimination, because suppliers cannot 
commit to marginal prices in the same way as they can to product quality, the 
intuition is appealing, especially in the context of the multi-market contact which we 
observe for electricity where firms may have the opportunity to develop reputations 
or signal their intentions.29  
 
Second, the assumption that tariffs can be implemented without cost may not be 
valid in practice. Miravete (2007) shows that monopolists in the early US cellular 
telephone industry could extract 95% of the potential profits available from a full 
menu of optimal tariffs through the use of only a single two-part tariff. The existence 
of small costs of tariff development or implementation could therefore help explain 
why such monopolies chose to offer only a small number of tariffs. Such costs would 
also help explain why, in the present case, we observed the incumbent monopolists 
using only using single two-part tariffs pre-liberalisation, and could offer an 
alternative explanation for the existence of single tariffs under oligopoly post-
liberalisation.  
 
Third, there is a clear conflict between the theoretical assumption of fully informed 
rational consumers and the behaviour of consumers observed in practice (e.g. 
Wilson and Waddams Price 2008). Understanding how consumer information and 
rationality are bounded, and how this impacts on firms’ tariff choices, remains an 
open and difficult question, but one which deserves further study. 
 
 
                                                 
29 Busse (2000) provides related evidence that suggests multi-market contact may enable suppliers to signal their 
intention to set higher tariffs (across all levels of consumption) by pricing identically across multiple-regions.  
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Appendix   
 
Equation (2) can be derived from a set of underlying best response functions in tariff 
weightings.  In any given market (region) j  at time t , suppose the incumbent, I , 
and the (n-1) entrants, , set their tariff weightings according to the following  
equations. 
1,...1 n n
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Heterogeneity is allowed between the firms by permitting 0... 110  naaa , and 
no restrictions are placed on the values of b  or c . Subtracting (A0) from each of 
(A1), … (A ) then yields (2*), which parallels equation (2) in the text. 1n
 












 c
uu
W
c
cb
c
aWW jt
k
jtI
jt
kI
jt
k
jt 111
0
 )1,...(1  nk  (2*) 
 
For estimation purposes, this implies the use of i) entrant-specific fixed effects, ii) 
instrumental variables, as OLS will yield biased estimates due to the presence of  
in the disturbance term and iii) clustering, due to the presence of  in all the 
disturbance terms within a given region. 
0u
0u
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